My project is aimed at examining some exegetical hypotheses concerning the way John Duns Scotus (ca. 1265–1308) specifies the role God plays in the emergence of what is possible but not necessary. Some commentators claim that such a role must be minor, since possibility is a matter of logical consistency, and whatever is consistent is so by itself—in Scotus’s own words, formaliter ex se. Others argue that consistency is a relative property and can only emerge after God has produced the most basic building blocks of creation.
More specifically, I intend to examine whether this latter reading can be substantiated by Scotus’s doctrine of unqualifiedly simple concepts (simpliciter simplex conceptus). Since these are the basic building blocks within the conceptual realm, this seems a promising place to look for clues as to how Scotus might have developed the idea of basic building blocks of creation, give the fact that he did not do so explicitly.
There are, of course, some pitfalls. To mention just one: the main issue concerns not concepts, but things and their modal statuses. If the hypothesis in question is to gain traction, the gap between the conceptual and the real must first be bridged.
